Opinion: Rumblings in the rocket force and war wariness in the PLA

The comprehensive transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a universally acknowledged reality. Its signature projects, the PLA Rocket and Strategic Support Forces (PLARF & PLASSF), set up as separate services in 2015, have been subjects of widespread commentary and even grudging admiration.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, current Commander of the US Pacific Fleet and Commander -in- Chief designate, IPACOM, has gone so far as to say that the DF-21 and DF-26 rocket bases along the 9,000 mile Chinese coastline have redefined the very principles of naval warfare in the Western Pacific.

The current global spotlight on the twin projects is, of course, for a set of very different (dubious) reasons – economic sleaze, informational compromise and a crisis of confidence about their operational readiness. An opportune time, perhaps, to audit the two instruments in terms of their true worth: are they merely vanity projects degraded further by the aforesaid toxins or will their operational effects indeed be game changing in a future conflict?

So, Chinese President Xi Jinping conceived the two forces as this bold, innovative, cross-cutting enterprise of lethal, long-range precision: the RF as an instrument of global deterrence, the SSF as a purveyor of exquisite capacities in digital combat. Inspired by the success of the American Recce Strike Complex (RSC) of earlier decades, in structuring this new enterprise, the PLA scaled up its ambitions by a breathtaking order of magnitude. It sought to fuse ubiquitous sensors from across eight domains (land, air, sea, subsea, sea bed, EM, space and cyber), use algorithms for the rapid conversion of sensory information to robust targeting data and leverage AI and cloud computing for in-flight targeting updates, to achieve what in military parlance is called ‘combat overmatch.’

So, in terms of range, the PLARF has great magazine depth (SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs and ICBMs) to strike target sets in Taiwan, the two island chains, the aircraft carriers that sail in between, the IPACOM forward base and the command and control centre in Guam, right up to heartland United States.

In terms of radar evasion and manoeuvrability (given the considerable lead that the Chinese have in hypersonic technologies), the widespread view is that the PLARF will saturate and penetrate the American missile defense collective of Aegis, Patriot and THAAD systems. With regard to precision, the PLARF systems exceed the accuracy of its rival - America’s Global Precision Strike System. To improve targeting, since 2015, the PLA has increased its orbital presence by 379 per cent. Further, it is scheduled to launch 13,000 LEO satellites over the next two years to catch up with Elon Musk’s 42000.

The PLARF poses a serious challenge therefore to American force projection capacities in the Western Pacific, as also the USA’s ability to meet its obligations with regard to treaty allies and partners. Along with stealth drones, loiter munitions, J-7s, J-20s, H-6, H-20s (long range stealth bombers), the spectrum of PLA air missile threats spearheaded by the RF, challenge the dominance of traditional American air superiority / missile defense in unprecedented ways.

Some informed analysts dub the Chinese Rocket Force as the most advanced ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile programme in the world. The PLA also boasts of the most advanced testing infrastructure in the world (tunnelling, etc). Since 2021, the PLA has tested 135 ballistic missiles – more than all the missile nations of the world put together. As the centre piece of Xi’s scheme to execute the prospective military re-unification of Taiwan, the signature projects are veritably make or break instruments.

The PLARF’s nuclear breakout is equally breathtaking. Not only is it growing its launchers, nuclear warheads and silos with great gusto, it has created two distinct sub-systems – one designed for deterrence in theatre (TNWs with counter force accuracies) and the other to signal to the US homeland (megaton warheads with counter value accuracies).

A natural consequence is the considerable unease, not only in the Pentagon, but also the discomfiture amongst adversary militaries in the Indo-Pacific. American B-52 stealth bombers have been dispersed from bases in Guam to Northern Australia. Missile defenses in Guam, Darwin and the Pine Gap are going through billion-dollar upgrades. The radar network is being upgraded with hypersonic filters, a new generation of Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors ). Satellites are being deployed. The USA is exploring testing facilities for its precision strike/hypersonic missiles in Australia.

Missile defenses will no longer do, is the American professional view – there is a need for comprehensive capacity upgrade to ensure comprehensive Missile Defeat. The RF and PLASSF, therefore, do not appear to be mere vanity projects. They could be game changers in a future fight.

It is in the above context that the reported fissures/wrongdoings in the HR apparatus of the PLA are worrying President Xi so much, enough for him, during a July 2023 CMC meeting, to urge the PLA top brass to set up ‘early warning mechanisms to nip integrity risks’ while announcing that he was launching ‘investigations to probe corruption scandals in the PLA over the last six years.’ Xi’s worries began with the mysterious death of Wang Sho Jun, Director CCP, Central Security Bureau (responsible for Xi’s security and spying on his rivals).

The demise of Feng Yang He, PLA’s AI expert and architect of the PLA’s much touted AI-enabled Battle Command Network, in a car accident led to further speculation. The subsequent arrest of the PLARF Commander (Li Yuchao), the suicide of a former Deputy Commander, the investigation of 10 other RF Generals and the alleged investigation of the PLASSF Cdr, point to the greatest purge in the PLA since 2012.

Xi’s proteges – his own appointees - have been disloyal to him; those entrusted with the care of an increasingly ready to use nuclear arsenal [(more Launch on Warning (LOW) than No First Use (NFU)] are accused of ineptitude and informational compromise. There are rumours that Li Yuchao’s son leaked some information to the Americans. Qing Gang, former foreign minister, under the influence of Fu (TV hostess and his mistress), failed to report the breach with dispatch, leading to his sacking. Former RF Cdr and Defence Minister Wei Fenghe is also reportedly being investigated. The penetration of external intelligence is widely suspected. Whatever be the truth, the developments are scary, not only for the CCP, but also for the integrity and stability of the nuclear deterrent of a 21st century superpower.

Some of the problems of the RF also originated from a crisis of confidence about its war readiness for a Taiwan contingency, thus earning the ire of Xi. This also points to a larger divide within the PLA, where there seems to be two factions. One group led by the likes of Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), General Zhang Youxia, point to a receding strategic opportunity (a declining economy and the technological caging of China by a USA-led West) and leaned in favour of a preponement of the Taiwan contingency. Others, like respected soldier-scholar and former political commissar NDU, General Liu Yazhou, are of the view that the PLA is not operationally ready.

A recent war game in the Tangshan harbour also came to the conclusion that the PLA currently was not in a position to achieve either sea or air control. So, as the time for a military conflict nears, the PLA, which has not been to war since 1979, seems to be showing signs of nervousness.

China may be beginning to realise that pretensions to power are one thing; the pursuit of real powerhood is quite another ballgame. The military burdens of power are a costly gamble, sometimes unsustainable.

What are the implications for India? Well, all said and done, the only answer to a potent PLARF/PLASSF combine seems to be a sophisticated Indian Missile Force – a comprehensive ecosystem of long-range precision: ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, propelled by capacities in space, cyber and the EM driven non-kinetic prowess as part of an Integrated Deterrence Architecture. Its ideational shaping, operational orientation, technological attributes and resourcing must be carefully thought through. Half way houses, it is manifestly clear, will not do.

Deterrence is, of course, costly, but alas, wars are costlier.

(Views expressed in this opinion piece are that of the author.)